Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2008

"Carhart", Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret
Chris Guthrie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chris Guthrie, "Carhart", Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 Southern California Law
Review. 877 (2008)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/820

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Oct 24 16:22:32 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret , 81 S.
CAL. L. REV. 877 (2008).
ALWD 7th ed.
Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret , 81 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 877 (2008).
APA 7th ed.
Guthrie, C. (2008). Carhart, constitutional rights, and the psychology of regret
Southern California Law Review, 81(5), 877-904.
Chicago 17th ed.
Chris Guthrie, "Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret ,"
Southern California Law Review 81, no. 5 (July 2008): 877-904
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Chris Guthrie, "Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret " (2008)
81:5 S Cal L Rev 877.
AGLC 4th ed.
Chris Guthrie, 'Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret ' (2008)
81(5) Southern California Law Review 877
MLA 9th ed.
Guthrie, Chris. "Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret ."
Southern California Law Review, vol. 81, no. 5, July 2008, pp. 877-904. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Chris Guthrie, 'Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret ' (2008)
81 S Cal L Rev 877
Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Law School
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

ARTICLES
CARHART, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REGRET
CHRIS GUTHRIE*

ABSTRACT
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court upheld the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act. In so doing, the Court used the prospect of regret to
justify limiting choice. Relying on empirical evidence documenting the four
ways in which regret actually operates, this Article argues that the Court's
analysis reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the psychology of
regret. By exposing the Court's misunderstanding of this emotion, this
Article seeks to minimize the most significant risk posed by the Carhart
decision: that states will use the prospect of regret to justify additional
constraints not only on the abortion right but also on other rights protected
by the Constitution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the prospect of regret justify limiting choice? Last year, the
Supreme Court answered this question affirmatively when it upheld the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in Gonzales v. Carhart.1 Writing for a 5-4
majority, Justice Kennedy based the Court's decision, in part, on what
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. For
comments on earlier drafts, I thank Jeremy Blumenthal, Mark Brandon, Rebecca Brown, Jonathan
Cardi, Doni Gewirtzman, Tracey George, John Goldberg, Joanna Grossman, Brad Joondeph, Terry
Maroney, Greg Mitchell, Robert Pushaw, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Suzanna Sherry, and Tom Ulen. For
research and library assistance, I thank DeNae Thomas and Michael Jackson.
1. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
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commentators have called "the most startling passage in the opinion ' 2 and
"a major departure from how the court has framed the abortion issue for the
past 34 years": 3 "While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.
4
Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow."
2. Jeffrey Toobin, Five to Four, NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007, at 35. See also Tony Mauro,
Kennedy Swings, Abortion Rights Take Hit, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at 8, 8 (observing that the
Court "has introduced wrenching and controversial new language into the abortion debate").
3. Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women from Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2007, at A18.
4. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (internal citation omitted). In its rather muddled analysis, the
Court observed that Congress enacted the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act to promote two governmental
interests: (1) respect for the dignity of human life and (2) respect for the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession. Regret, the Court contended, is relevant to both.
With regard to the former state interest, the Court concluded that the Act promotes respect for the
dignity of human life by honoring a woman's love for her unborn child:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for
her child. The Act recognizes this reality as well. Whether to have an abortion requires a
difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
With regard to the latter state interest, the Court concluded that the Act promotes respect for the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession by acknowledging that even though doctors should
provide informed consent to patients regarding the intact D & E procedure, they might be disinclined to
do so because the abortion decision is "so fraught with emotional consequence." Id. As a result, a
woman undergoing this procedure is likely to lack important information and thereby experience even
greater postabortion regret than she would generally:
It is ... precisely this lack of information concerning the way in which the fetus will be
killed that is of legitimate concern to the State. The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a
choice is well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to
abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns,
only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull
and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
As Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent, it seems odd that the Court decides not to compel
doctors to disclose this important information to inform choice but instead to uphold the ban on the
procedure. See id. at 1648-49 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("The solution the Court approves, then, is not
to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different procedures and their
attendant risks. Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at
the expense of their safety."). Indeed, relevant research evidence that is not cited by the dissent shows
that postdecision regret is often exacerbated when decision makers believe they had inadequate
information to make a decision. See, e.g., Joanne Sheehan et al., Association of Information
Satisfaction, Psychological Distress and Monitoring Copying Style with Post-Decision Regret
Following Breast Reconstruction, 16 PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 342, 348 (2007) (finding that women
undergoing reconstructive surgery following a mastectomy "who experienced lower satisfaction with
information were more likely to experience moderate to strong regret, compared to those experiencing
no regret"); Jo Ellen Stryker et al., Understandingthe Decisions of Cancer Clinical Trial Participants
to Enter Research Studies: Factors Associated with Informed Consent, Patient Satisfaction, and
Decisional Regret, 63 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 104, 108 (2006) (finding, in a study of informed
consent among patients making the difficult decision to participate in a clinical cancer trial, that
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Writing for the dissent, Justice Ginsburg called the Court's invocation
of postabortion regret an "antiabortion shibboleth."5 In contrast to Justice
Kennedy, who relied on affidavits from women describing their feelings of
postabortion regret,6 Justice Ginsburg cited a litany of scientific studies
finding "no 7 reliable evidence" to support the existence of this
phenomenon.
Nonetheless, the Court's regret analysis in Carharthas now become
"part of Supreme Court doctrine." 8 Indeed, leading constitutional law
scholar Jack Balkin described the Court's privileging of postabortion regret
" '9
over preabortion choice as "the big news about Gonzales v. Carhart.
But there might be bigger news yet: the impact of the Court's regret
analysis could extend well beyond partial-birth abortion claims (as in
Carhart) to abortion rights claims more generally (d la Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey10 and Roe v. Wade"1 ).
In Carhart,after all, the Court relied on claims of regret arising not from
partial-birth (or "intact D & E") abortions specifically but from abortion
generally. Thus, it seems likely that state legislatures will use Carhart's
regret analysis to impose other restrictions on abortion, including waiting
periods, notice obligations, informed consent requirements, etc. Indeed,
prior to the decision in Carhart, the South Dakota legislature invoked
regret-related concerns to ban abortion in that state,1 2 and commentators
"[p]articipants who reported being well-informed about the clinical trial were significantly less likely to
later express regret about their decision to join the trial compared to participants who believed
themselves to be less informed").
5. Carhart,127 S.Ct. at 1648 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
6. An antiabortion group called the Justice Foundation collected these affidavits and appended
them to its amicus brief on behalf of Sandra Cano. See Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former "Mary Doe"
of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1-2,
apps. 11-106, Carhart,127 S.Ct. 1610 (No. 05-380).
7. See Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1648 n.7. Ginsburg observed that "'neither the weight of the
scientific evidence to date nor the observable reality of 33 years of legal abortion in the United States
comports with the idea that having an abortion is any more dangerous to a woman's long-term mental
health than delivering and parenting a child that she did not intend to have .
I...'
Id. at 1649 n.7
(quoting Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Mental Health: Myths and Realities, GUrTMACHER POL'Y
REv., Summer 2006, at 8, 8).
8. Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/big-news-aboutgonzales-v-carhart.html (Apr. 19, 2007, 14:50 EST).
9. Id.
10. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
11.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. See Women's Health and Human Life Protection Act, HB 1215, 81st Sess. (S.D. 2006)
(repealed by voter referendum Nov. 7, 2006); REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY
ABORTION 21-22 (2005). See also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis
of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 991, 992 (arguing that the South
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3
suspect that Carhartwill empower other state legislatures to act similarly.'
If additional restrictions are then challenged in court, lower courts are
likely to rely on Carhart'sregret analysis to justify these restrictions. As
Fred Schauer has observed, the lower courts tend to follow what the
Supreme Court has said rather than what it has actually done because when

they find themselves "in the pit of actual application ....one good quote is

worth a hundred clever analyses of the holding."' 4 And if, in turn, the
Supreme Court ultimately hears any of these abortion cases, there is reason
to believe that the Court would follow its own regret analysis, at least as
long as Justice Kennedy remains on the Court.
More importantly, Carhart'sregret analysis has the potential to extend
well beyond abortion. The Constitution protects several rights that, if
exercised, could lead the rights holder to experience regret. For example, a
criminal defendant who is unsuccessful in front of a jury of his peers might
regret his decision to exercise his right to trial; likewise, a political
protestor might regret his emotional tirade in the town square upon learning
of the opprobrium brought upon him by his self-expression. In
circumstances like these, can the state use the logic of Carhartto prohibit
or limit such conduct on the basis of the regret that a rights holder might
feel? Can the state, for example, impose limits on the jury trial right or the
speech right in order to protect individuals from experiencing regret upon
exercising those rights? And if so, will the Court uphold this legislation, as
in Carhart,on the basis of that emotion?
At first glance, it might appear unlikely that the Court would extend
its regret analysis beyond abortion. Abortion, after all, might be unusual in
that it implicates, at least for some people, deeply held moral and religious
beliefs. But abortion is hardly alone. Other constitutional issues-including
certain speech rights, same-sex sexual behavior, principles of
nondiscrimination, and the right to die-also implicate deeply held views.
And, as an analytical matter, if the state is deemed to have a legitimate
interest in protecting citizens from experiencing regret associated with the
exercise of one right, the state should also have an interest in protecting
Dakota ban "gave prominent official endorsement to a claim that has been quietly spreading for
decades: that abortion harms women," subjecting them to "emotional and physical injuries").
13. See, e.g., Robin Toner, Abortion Foes See Validationfor New Tactic, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
the
2007, at Al (arguing that the Court's regret analysis will "galvaniz[e] anti-abortion forces and set[]
stage for an intensifying battle over new abortion restrictions in the states"). See also Stephanie Simon,
Changing Abortion's Pronoun, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at Al (reporting that the Justice Foundation is
currently soliciting affidavits from men documenting postabortion pain as another tool to advocate for
limits on abortion).
14. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986) (book review).
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citizens from experiencing regret associated with the exercise of other
rights. Thus, the Court might very well extend its regret analysis beyond
abortion to the evaluation of other rights claims.15
If the Court is going to limit constitutional rights on the basis of the
regret a rights holder might experience-as it did in Carhart-itshould be
sure to understand how regret works. Drawing upon an elaborate body of
psychological research that describes the way regret actually operates,
this
16
ways:
four
in
emotion
this
misunderstood
Court
the
that
finds
Article
First, regret aversion. Because most of us find the prospect of regret
unappealing, we tend to factor it into our decisionmaking and take steps to
avoid it. This means that an individual contemplating the exercise of a right
that might give rise to regret, such as the abortion right, is likely to
17
anticipate that regret and seek to avoid it.
Second, regret overestimation. When contemplating the prospect of
regret, we tend to overestimate both its intensity and duration; thus, if we
actually experience that regret, we tend to find it significantly less painful
and long lasting than we anticipated. This means that an individual
contemplating the exercise of a right is likely to find that any regret she
ultimately feels, if any at all, is not nearly as bad as expected.' 8
Third, regret dampening. Each of us possesses a set of psychological
tactics that enable us to dampen any regret that we actually experience.
This means that an individual who exercises a right is likely to take steps to
9
minimize or dampen any regret that she feels.'
Finally, regret learning. Even if we find ourselves in the throes of
regret, it turns out that regret can serve a powerful function by enabling us
to make better choices for ourselves in the future. This means that an
individual who exercises a right may have a unique opportunity to learn
from any regret she might feel.2"
To be sure, the Court's concern that abortion might lead to the
15.
But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-BirthAbortion and the Perils of Constitutional
Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 519, 567-72 (2008) (arguing that Carhartis not as far-

reaching as many commentators have asserted).
16.
In other words, this Article argues that the Court erroneously relies on what Terry Maroney
calls "emotional common sense" rather than empirical research on the emotion of regret. See Terry A.

Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law (June 27, 2008) (working paper, on file
with the author).
17.
18.
19.
20.

See discussion
See discussion
See discussion
See discussion

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

II.A.
II.B.
II.C.
II.D.
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possibility of regret is certainly not unwarranted. But due to regret aversion,
regret overestimation, regret dampening, and regret learning, this Article
argues that the Court should not abrogate the abortion right or any other
Constitutional right on the basis of regret. In short, the Court got regret
wrong in Carhart, and it should not extend its regret analysis beyond the
21
four corners of the Carhartdecision.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF REGRET
A.

REGRET AVERSION

Limiting the right to choose on the basis of regret presupposes that a
woman contemplating abortion is unable to anticipate the prospect of regret
and is somehow caught off guard when she experiences it. In fact, however,

there is ample evidence to the contrary, suggesting that the prospect of
regret informs and influences decisionmaking.
Regret is among the most common of emotions. 22 Across a lifetime,
we make literally millions of decisions.23 Inevitably, some of these turn out
badly, and when they do, we may experience regret. 24 Although there is

some dispute over the definition of this seemingly universal emotion, most
scholars agree that regret is a painful feeling we experience upon
determining that we could have obtained a better outcome if we had
25
decided or behaved differently.
21.
This Article adds to the burgeoning literature on law and emotion. For an illuminating
overview, see generally Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging
Field,30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Rudiger Bittner, Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?, 89 J.PHIL. 262, 262
(1992) ("We all know regret."); Susan B. Shimanoff, Commonly Named Emotions in Everyday
Conversations, 58 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 514, 514 (1984) (finding in an analysis of the
everyday conversations of college students and married couples that regret was the second most
frequently mentioned emotion). But see Len Lecci, Morris A. Okun & Paul Karoly, Life Regrets and
Current Goals as Predictorsof PsychologicalAdjustment, 66 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 731,
736 (1994) (finding, in a study of life regrets and goals, that subjects reported very few life regrets).
23. See, e.g., Marcel Zeelenberg & Rik Pieters, A Theory of Regret Regulation 1.0, 17 J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 3, 3 (2007) ("The average consumer makes a couple of thousands of decisions
daily.") (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What,
When, and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 379, 379 (1995) ("A lifetime of making choices brings with it the
knowledge that at least some actions were ill-considered, some failures to act unwise. For most of us, it
also brings with it the realization that some of these unfortunate outcomes could have been avoided.").
25. See, e.g., STUART HAMPSHIRE, THOUGHT AND ACTION 241 (1960) (defining regret as "a
feeling of unpleasure associated with a thought of the past, together with the identification of an object
and the announcement of an inclination to behave in a certain way in the future"); JANET LANDMAN,
REGRET 36 (1993) (defining regret as "a more or less painful cognitive and emotional state of feeling
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Because regret is both common and painful-because it causes us to
"feel a sinking feeling," to fret over "a lost opportunity" and "a
mistake... made," and to feel like "kicking" ourselves 26 -we tend to
anticipate circumstances in which we might experience it27 and we seek to
avoid it if possible. 28 Faced with the prospect of regret, we commonly defer
decisionmaking, 29 avoid decisionmaking altogether, 30 or make decisions
that appear to offer us a way to sidestep feelings of regret. 31 Because we
tend to anticipate that actions are more likely than inactions to lead to
feelings of regret, we are particularly likely to make decisions that maintain
the status quo.32 In the context of abortion decisionmaking, this suggests
that many women will carry to term rather than abort as a way of avoiding
anticipated regret.
Researchers from several disciplines employing many different
research methods have found a wealth of empirical evidence demonstrating
sorry for misfortunes, limitations, losses, transgressions, shortcomings, or mistakes"); David E. Bell,
Reply, Putting a Premium on Regret, 31 MGMT. SCI. 117, 117 (1985) ("Regret is created by a
comparison between the actual outcome and that outcome that would have occurred had the decision
maker made a different choice."); George Greenberg & Mary FitzPatrick, Regret as an Essential
Ingredient in Psychotherapy, in PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE REMORSEFUL PATIENT 35, 35 (E. Mark

Stem ed. 1988) (defining regret as "the unpleasant feeling associated with some action or inaction a
person has taken which has led to a state of affairs that he or she wishes were different").
26. Ira J. Roseman, Cynthia Wiest & Tamara S. Swartz, Phenomenology, Behaviors, and Goals
DifferentiateDiscrete Emotions, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 206, 217 tbl. 1 (1994).
27. See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 158 (2004)
("[Tihe prospect of regret is an important cause of many decisions. People will make choices with the
anticipation of regret firmly in mind.").
28. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
29. See generally, e.g., Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116
Q.J. ECON. 121 (2001) (exploring our tendency to procrastinate when facing unpleasant decisions).
See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 159 (observing that one "effect that the desire to
30.
avoid regret can have is to induce people not to act at all"); Jane Beattie et al., Psychological
Determinantsof Decision Attitude, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 129 (1994) (providing experimental
evidence showing that anticipated regret can lead to decision avoidance).
31. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text. In fact, scholars have developed an entire
decision theory-a rival to expected utility or rational choice theory-based on anticipated regret or
regret aversion. Efforts to develop a decision theory based on regret began as early as the 1950s. See,
e.g., LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 163-71 (Dover Publ'ns 1972) (1954)

(proposing a "minimax rule" intended to recommend courses of action with the smallest possible
downside). "Modem" regret theory, however, emerged in early 1980s, when it was developed by three
decision theorists. See David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS
RES. 961 (1982); Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational
Choice Under Uncertainty,92 ECON. J. 805 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich, Victoria Husted Medvec & Serena Chen, Commission, Omission,
and Dissonance Reduction: Coping with Regret in the "Monty Hall" Problem, 21 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 182, 183 (1995) (reporting that studies "indicate that people believe they would
regret a negative outcome that stemmed from an action more than an equivalent outcome that stemmed
from an inaction").
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that we seek to minimize or avoid regret. When making ordinary, everyday
34
33
decisions-like deciding what goods to buy, what investments to make,
whether to play the lottery, 35 and how to negotiate 36-we seek to minimize
regret. Likewise, when making more consequential decisions involving our
health and well-being and the health and well-being of others, we also tend
to make regret-minimizing decisions. 37 For example, researchers have
33. See, e.g., J. Jeffrey Inman & Leigh McAlister, Do Coupon Expiration Dates Affect Consumer
Behavior?, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 423 (1994) (finding, based on a review of coupon redemption
behavior, that anticipated regret may explain the increase in coupon redemptions prior to coupon
expiration dates); Kathleen N. Lemon, Tiffany Barnett White & Russell S. Winer, Dynamic Customer
Relationship Management: IncorporatingFuture Considerationsinto the Service Retention Decision, J.
MARKETING, Jan. 2002, at 1, 12 (finding that "anticipated future regret significantly influences the
customer's decision to keep or drop the service"); Allen R. McConnell et al., What If Find It Cheaper
Someplace Else?: Role of Prefactual Thinking and Anticipated Regret in Consumer Behavior, 17
PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 281 (2000) (finding that the prospect that an item will be priced lower in the
future can prevent customers from purchasing it and that price guarantees can minimize this effect);
Itamar Simonson, The Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibility on Purchase Decisions, 19 J.
CONSUMER RES. 105 (1992) (finding evidence that the prospect of regret influences brand purchase
decisions, among others).
34. See, e.g., Hersh M. Shefrin & Meir Statman, Explaining Investor Preferencefor Cash
Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (1984) (analyzing investors' preference for cash dividends over stock
dividends). See also Chinmoy Ghosh, A Regret-Theoretic Explanation of Corporate Dividend Policy,
20 J. Bus. FIN. & AcCT. 559 (1993) (examining financial managers' behavior from a regret aversion
perspective). But see Jeffrey J. Bailey & Chris Kinerson, Regret Avoidance and Risk Tolerance, FIN.
COUNSELING & PLANNING, 2005 Issue 1, at 23, 26-27 (finding that experienced regret but not
anticipated regret influenced hypothetical investment decisions).
35. See Paschal Sheeran & Sheina Orbell, Augmenting the Theory of Planned Behavior: Roles
for Anticipated Regret and Descriptive Norms, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2107, 2133 (1999)
(finding that anticipated regret increases intentions to play the lottery); Marcel Zeelenberg & Rik
Pieters, Consequences of Regret Aversion in Real Life: The Case of the Dutch Postcode Lottery, 93
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 155, 165 (2004) ("The present research has
shown, in a series of four studies, that a specific lottery that provides [feedback] information to their
(potential) players, the Postcode Lottery, may evoke anticipations of regret and that these anticipations
may hence influence participation decisions.").
36. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation
Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 73-79 (providing evidence that the opportunity to minimize
postdecision regret induces litigants to settle rather than try cases); Chris Guthrie, Panacea or
Pandora'sBox?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 636-38 (2003) (finding
that subjects deemed negotiators who had to reject options more regretful than those who did not);
Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preferencein ContractNegotiation: The Psychological Powerof Default
Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1587-91 (1998) (providing experimental data showing
that anticipated regret may explain negotiators' preference for default terms in contract negotiations);
Richard P. Larrick & Terry L. Boles, Avoiding Regret in Decisions with Feedback: A Negotiation
Example, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 87, 94 (1995) (finding regret
aversion in an employment negotiation exercise); Marcel Zeelenberg & Jane Beattie, Consequences of
Regret Aversion 2: Additional Evidence for Effects of Feedback on Decision Making, 72
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 63, 69-71 (1997) (finding that anticipated
regret influenced subjects' negotiation behavior in an ultimatum game).
37. But see Vered Murgraff et al., Regret Is What You Get: The Effects of Manipulating
Anticipated Affect and Time Perspective on Risky Single-Occasion Drinking, 34 ALCOHOL &
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found that anticipated regret induces us to diet,38 exercise,3 9 seek
vaccinations, 40 undergo medical procedures, 4 1 drive safely,4 2 engage in
environmentally protective behavior, 43 and practice safe sex. 4 4 In short,
ALCOHOLISM 590, 598 (1999) (finding that anticipated affect-including, but not limited to, anticipated
regret-did not reduce subjects' intentions to engage in "risky single-occasion drinking").
38.
See, e.g., Andrew Steptoe et al., Psychologicaland Social Predictorsof Changes in Fruitand
Vegetable Consumption Over 12 Months Following Behavioraland Nutrition Education Counseling,23
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 574 (2004) (finding that short-term changes in anticipated regret and other
psychological variables predicted longer-term changes in fruit and vegetable consumption); Andrew
Steptoe etal., Sociodemographicand PsychologicalPredictorsof Changes in DietaryFat Consumption
in Adults With High Blood Cholesterol Following Counseling in Primary Care, 19 HEALTH PSYCHOL.
411, 417 (2000) ("We found that patients reporting high anticipated regret showed larger dietary
changes than those who anticipated little regret about not taking action.").
39.
See, e.g., Charles Abraham & Paschal Sheeran, Acting on Intentions: The Role ofAnticipated
Regret, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 495 (2003) (finding that anticipated regret promoted consistency
between intent to exercise and actual behavior); Charles Abraham & Paschal Sheeran, Deciding to
Exercise: The Role of Anticipated Regret, 9 BRIT. J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 269, 275 (2004) (finding that
"contemplating anticipated regret ...result[s] in stronger intentions to exercise").
40.
Gretchen B. Chapman & Elliot J. Coups, Emotions and Preventive Health Behavior: Worry,
Regret, and Influenza Vaccination, 25 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 82, 85 (2006) (finding that people are more
likely to seek flu vaccinations based on anticipated regret and worry than on their perceived risk of
actually contracting the flu).
41.
See, e.g., Tjeerd Tymstra, The Imperative CharacterofMedical Technology and the Meaning
of "Anticipated Decision Regret," 5 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 207, 211 (1989)
(finding that "[p]reventing feelings of regret appears to be a motive for undergoing [in vitro
fertilization]"). Anticipated regret appears not only to influence patients' decisions, but also the
decisions of health care providers. See, e.g., Christopher C. Colenda et al., Anticipated Regret
Associated with Treatment DecisionsforAgitated Dementia Patients, 3 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY
68, 72 (1995) (finding that physicians anticipated significant regret if they failed to order some type of
treatment or intervention and patients were subsequently harmed). See also Alvan R. Feinstein, The
"Chagrin Factor" and Qualitative Decision Analysis, 145 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1257, 1257
(1985) ("Since the relative magnitudes of chagrin will differ for different types of wrong results, a
customary clinical strategy is to choose the option whose wrong result will cause the least chagrin.");
Cheryl B. Travis, Raymond H. Phillipi & Bruce E. Tonn, Judgment Heuristics and Medical Decisions,
13 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 211, 215 (1989) (proposing regret avoidance as one possible
explanation for clinical treatment decisions).
42.
Dianne Parker, Antony S.R. Manstead & Stephen G. Stradling, Extending the Theory of
Planned Behaviour: The Role of PersonalNorm, 34 BRIT. J.SOC. PSYCHOL. 127, 134 (1995) ("[T]he
more respondents anticipated feeling regret.., the less likely they [are] to report intentions to [commit
a risky driving violation]."). See also Dianne Parker, Stephen G. Stradling & Antony S.R. Manstead,
Modifying Beliefs and Attitudes to Exceeding the Speed Limit: An Intervention Study Based on the
Theory of Planned Behavior, 26 J.APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 14 (1996) (reporting that viewers of an
anticipated-regret video described more negative attitudes toward speeding).
43.
Florian G. Kaiser, A Moral Extension of the Theory of Planned Behavior: Norms and
Anticipated Feelings ofRegret in Conservationism, 41 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 71
(2006) (finding that anticipated feelings of "moral regret" induce conservation and other
environmentally friendly conduct).
44. See Ren6 Richard, Joop van der Pligt & Nanne de Vries, Anticipated Affective Reactions and
Prevention ofAIDS, 34 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 9, 16-17 (1995) (refraining from casual sex and use of
condoms); Ren6 Richard, Nanne K. de Vries & Joop van der Pligt, Anticipated Regret and
PrecautionarySexual Behavior, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1411, 1418-22 (1998) (use of condoms);
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"[o]ur most consequential choices-whether to marry, have children, buy a
house, enter a profession, move abroad-are often shaped by how we
imagine our future regrets. 45
This means that a woman contemplating abortion is likely to
anticipate the possibility that she will experience regret upon terminating
her pregnancy. Because she knows that regret is an unpleasant emotion, she
is likely to avoid it if she can. This is not to say, of course, that regret is the
only emotion she is likely to anticipate; in many circumstances, for
example, she might also anticipate feeling relief when she completes the
abortion procedure. This is also not to say that abortion is the only potential
source of regret in these circumstances; for example, she might also
anticipate feeling regret if she carries to term. For purposes of the argument
developed in this Article, the point is that we can reasonably expect that a
woman making the abortion choice, or any individual making the choice to
exercise a presumed constitutional right, is likely to factor the prospect of
regret into her decisionmaking and to try to avoid experiencing it if she
can. The Supreme Court's presupposition in Carhart that a woman is
unable to anticipate the prospect of postabortion regret is belied by the
research on regret aversion.
B. REGRET OVERESTIMATION
A woman contemplating abortion is likely not only to anticipate the
prospect of regret, but also to overestimate its potential impact. The regret
she anticipates feeling might not materialize at all, but even if it does, it is
likely that it will not be nearly as bad as she imagines it would be.
Psychologists have discovered that we are often unable to predict how
an event will make us feel. In more technical terms, our "predicted utility"
(what we expect) is often quite different from our "experienced utility"
(what we experience at the time of the event) and our "retrospective utility"
(how we feel after the event has occurred).4 6
Rene Richard, Joop van der Pligt & Nanne de Vries, Anticipated Regret and Time Perspective:
Changing Sexual Risk-Taking Behavior, 9 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 185, 196 (1996) (finding that

"those who focused on their anticipated, post-behavioral feelings expressed stronger expectations to use
condoms in future sexual interactions, and that these respondents were more consistent condom users in
the five months following the experimental manipulation."); Ren6 Richard & Joop van der Pligt,
FactorsAffecting Condom Use Among Adolescents, I J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 105

(1991) (use of condoms); P. van Empelen et al., The Additional Value of Anticipated Regret and
Psychopathology in Explaining Intended Condom Use Among Drug Users, 13 AIDS CARE 309, 316
(2001) (condom use by drug users with steady partners).
45.

DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 178 (2006).

46.

Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 3 LEGAL THEORY 105,
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To be sure, we are not clueless about ourselves. We are actually quite
good at predicting whether we will feel positively or negatively about an
event,47 and we are generally quite good at anticipating the specific
emotions we will experience. 8 When we try to imagine how we would feel
upon getting married, for instance, we accurately predict that we will feel
positively rather than negatively and that the specific emotions we will
experience include happiness. Conversely, when we try to imagine how we
would feel upon developing a serious illness, we accurately anticipate that
we will feel negatively rather than positively and that the specific emotions
we will experience include fear.49
What we have difficulty with, however, is predicting how intense and
long lasting our emotional reactions will be. We may be able to predict that
we will feel happy on our wedding day and fearful when we become ill, but
we have difficulty predicting the intensity and duration of these emotions.
In other words, we are unable to anticipate the actual impact that events
will have on our sense of well-being:
Often people predict correctly the valence of their emotional reactions
("I'll feel good if I get the job") and correctly predict the specific
emotions they will experience (e.g., joy). Even when achieving such
accuracy, however, itis important for people to predict what the initial
intensity of the reaction will be (how much joy they will experience) and
the duration of that emotion (how long they will feel this way). It is
useful to know that we will feel happy on our first day at a new job, but
better to know how happy and how long this feeling will last, before
committing ourselves to a lifetime of work as a tax attorney. It is helpful
to know that it will be painful to end a long-term relationship, but better
to know how
painful and whether the pain will last half a second or half
50
a decade.

When anticipating how intense or long lasting our emotional reactions
to some event will be, we generally "overestimate the impact [on our]
107-09 (1997).
47.
Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 347 (2003) [hereinafter Wilson & Gilbert, Affective] (observing
that "[in general.., people make accurate predictions about which side of the neutral point their
emotional experiences will fall, especially if they have had experience in that domain").
48.
Id. at 401 (observing that "[pleople are.., skilled at guessing the specific kinds of emotional
reactions they will have").
49.
This ability to predict emotions to be experienced extends to regret. See, e.g., Barbara
Mellers, Alan Schwartz & Ilana Ritov, Emotion-Based Choice, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN.
332, 340-41 (1999) (reporting evidence that subjects were able to predict accurately that they would

experience regret).
50. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective, supra note 47, at 349 (emphasis added).
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emotional lives," imagining that the impact of an event will be much
greater than it turns out to be.51 This is what psychologists call the "impact
bias. 52 Researchers using a variety of methodological approaches have
found that we routinely commit impact bias, 53 particularly when we
anticipate feeling negative emotions like regret.54
In one illustrative study, researchers asked students enrolled in
introductory psychology classes to predict how they would feel if they
received a grade one level lower than they expected (for example, an Aminus rather than an expected A). 55 On a nine-point scale, participants
predicted, on average, that they would experience a well-being score of
3.37.56 In fact, however, when asked to report their well-being after
receiving a lower-than-expected grade, students reported an average wellbeing score of 4.95, demonstrating that they had predicted they would feel
much worse than they actually did.57
In another study, researchers took advantage of a student housing
lottery on a college campus. 58 They asked student-subjects to predict how
happy or unhappy they would be if they were assigned to each of the
available student houses. 59 On a seven-point scale, the students predicted
51. Id. But see Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting:Knowing What to
Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 131, 131 (2005) [hereinafter Wilson & Gilbert,
Knowing] (acknowledging that people occasionally underestimateintensity and duration).
52. Daniel T. Gilbert, Erin Driver-Linn & Timothy D. Wilson, The Trouble with Vronsky:
Impact Bias in the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in THE WISDOM IN FEELING:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 114, 115-17 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter

Salovey eds., 2002). For other attempts to explore the import of the impact bias on legally relevant
behavior, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,80
IND. L.J. 155 (2005); Chris Guthrie & David Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 817 (2004).
53. Wilson & Gilbert, Knowing, supra note 51, at 131 (observing that impact bias "has been
found repeatedly in a variety of populations and contexts").
54. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting,75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 626 (1998) [hereinafter Gilbert et al., Immune
Neglect] (observing in three prior studies that "participants overestimated the duration of their negative
affect, and they seemed to do so more dramatically and consistently than they overestimated the
duration of their positive affect").
55. Roger Buehler & Cathy McFarland, Intensity Bias in Affective Forecasting: The Role of
Temporal Focus, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1480, 1483-84 (2001).
56. Id. at 1484.
57. Id. To address a couple of methodological problems with this study, the researchers
conducted a follow-up study in which they again found that subjects overestimated how negatively they
would react to receiving a grade that was below their expectations. Id. at 1484-85.
58. Elizabeth W. Dunn, Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Location, Location, Location:
The Misprediction of Satisfaction in Housing Lotteries, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1421, 1423-25 (2003).
59. Id. at 1423.
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that their happiness level would be an average of 3.43 if they were assigned
to housing they deemed undesirable. 60 A year later, the researchers asked
the same students to indicate how happy or unhappy they actually were.
Students assigned to housing they had previously deemed undesirable
reported an average happiness level of 5.38, nearly two points higher than
predicted.61 In fact, "participants assigned to desirable houses were not
62
significantly happier than participants assigned to undesirable houses."
In yet another study, researchers asked participants to predict how
they would feel if they experienced the breakup of a romantic relationship,
whether initiated by them or by their partner. 63 On a seven-point scale, they
predicted, on average, that their sense of well-being would be 3.89, near the
midpoint of the scale. 64 Those who broke up, however, reported an average
sense of well-being of 5.27 a mere two months after breaking up, indicating
a significantly higher level of well-being than had been anticipated.6 5
Finally, in a study focused specifically on regret,66 researchers asked
study participants to predict how much regret they would feel if they
decided to obtain flu vaccinations and nonetheless contracted the flu. 67 The
researchers found a statistically significant "discrepancy between
anticipated and experienced regret. 68 On a five-point scale (from "very
pleased" to "much regret"), vaccinators predicted they would experience an
average regret level of 2.8 1.69 When the researchers asked those same
vaccinators to report how much regret they actually felt, however, they
reported a regret level of 1.50, significantly lower than had been
expected.70 Importantly, "tt]he same results were obtained if the analysis
was limited to only those participants who reported getting the flu60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1423-24.
63. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 54, at 620-22.
64. Id. at 622 & tbl.2.
65. Id.
66. Chapman & Coups, supra note 40, at 84. For another study on the impact bias and regret, see
Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Looking Forward to Looking Backward: The Misprediction of Regret, 15
PSYCHOL. Scl. 346 (2004) [hereinafter Gilbert et al., Looking] (finding, in two studies, that we commit
impact bias when anticipating how much regret we will feel following a "near miss," like just missing
the subway).
67. Chapman & Coups, supra note 40.
68. Id. at 86. Note that the nonvaccinators, in contrast to the vaccinators, were able to predict
how much regret they would experience. Id. The researchers suggest that the difference between
vaccinators and nonvaccinators might be a product of the fact that vaccination is an active intervention,
while foregoing vaccination is an inactive embrace of the status quo. Id. at 88.
69. Id. at 85 tbl.2.
70. Id.
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7
presumably the event that would trigger experienced regret." '

In short, researchers have found that we overestimate the emotional
impact of all kinds of life events, including "romantic breakups, personal
insults, sports victories, electoral defeats, parachute jumps, failure to lose
weight, reading tragic stories, and learning the results of pregnancy and
HIV tests. 72 This seems true even with regard to such uncommon and
tragic events as "losing a child in a car accident, being diagnosed with
cancer, [or] becoming paralyzed., 73 Indeed, experts greatly overestimated
the number of New York City residents who would suffer lingering
74
psychological effects following the September 11 th terrorist attacks.
Researchers have identified two primary explanations for impact bias.
First, when we anticipate our reactions to a future event we tend to
disregard the impact that other life events are likely to have on our sense of
well-being at that time. When we focus on how happy we think our
marriage will make us, for example, we neglect to consider that problems
at work, health issues, and so forth will also have an impact on how we
feel. In short, we are prone to what researchers call "focalism" 75 or a
71.
Id. at 86.
72. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective, supra note 47, at 353.
73. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 54, at 618. For examples, see Glenn Affleck &
Howard Tennen, Construing Benefits from Adversity: Adaptational Significance and Dispositional
Underpinnings, 64 J. PERSONALITY 899, 901-02 (1996) (identifying several studies including the
survivors of "a wide array of medical problems for which nearly all or more than a majority of
informants cited benefits or gains from their adversity"); Rebecca L. Collins, Shelley E. Taylor &
Laurie A. Skokan, A Better World or a Shattered Vision? Changes in Life Perspectives Following
Victimization, 8 SOC. COGNITION 263, 271 (1990) (reporting that a sample of cancer patients "seemed
able to derive more benefit than harm from their experiences"); Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic
Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL: GEN. 3, 7 (2005) (finding that nonpatients predicted they would experience significantly
worse moods than actual patients reported experiencing when undergoing hemodialysis); Peter
Suedfeld, Reactions to Societal Trauma: Distress and/or Eustress, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 849, 858-59
(1997) ("[T]he 'bottom line' is that people most commonly put their lives together again and move
ahead, many citing greater strength, insight, altruism, and sense of purpose as consequences of their
traumatic experience."); Peter A. Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox
and Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57, S62 (2005) (surveying the research to
date and concluding that "[p]eople experiencing chronic illness and disability are happier than what
healthy people predict they would be under similar circumstances"). But see Dain R. Lehman et al.,
Positive and Negative Life Changes Following Bereavement and Their Relations to Adjustment, 12 J.
SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 90 (1993) (reporting skepticism about self-reports of positive life changes
following tragedies).
74. See Jerome Groopman, The GriefIndustry, NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2004, at 30, 33 (reporting
that the rates of posttraumatic stress disorder among New Yorkers following September 1I th were but a
tiny fraction of the rates predicted by experts).
75. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective, supra note 47, at 366 ("Events do not occur in a vacuum of
course, but in the rich context of many other events in people's lives. By neglecting to consider how
much these other events will capture their attention and influence their emotions, people overestimate
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"focusing illusion." 76 Second, researchers have found that we
underestimate the extent to which we possess a "psychological immune
system" 77 that allows us to adapt to life experiences. Upon experiencing an
event, we "inexorably explain and understand events that were initially
surprising and unpredictable, and this process lowers the intensity of
emotional reactions to the events."7 8 In advance, however, we do not
anticipate this because the processes of the psychological immune system
operate mostly at an unconscious level. 79 This is particularly so when we
face an event-like getting divorced, losing a job, or perhaps terminating a
pregnancy-that we anticipate will have a significant negative impact on
our well-being. In those circumstances, our psychological immune system
kicks into overdrive, working much harder to rationalize or dampen the
negative impact of such events. 80 Ironically, this means that minor
annoyances often have a more pronounced effect on our well-being than
major life events. 81 In other words, "it is sometimes more difficult to
achieve a positive view of a bad experience than of a very bad
82
experience."
For a woman anticipating regret following an abortion, the import of
the impact bias is clear. Because she is unlikely to anticipate the impact
that other aspects of her life, including friends, family, and work, will have
on her well-being, and because she is probably unaware that her
psychological immune system will diminish any regret she experiences, she
is likely to find that her actual experience of that regret is not nearly as bad
as expected. Regret, in short, is "a bit of a boogeyman" in that it tends to
83
"loom[ ] larger in prospect than it actually stands in experience."
This account is consistent with three related research findings. First,
researchers have found that most of us have something akin to a happiness
the impact of the focal event.").
76.
David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make People Happy? A
Focusing Illusion in Judgments ofLife Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 340passim (1998).

77.

Wilson & Gilbert, Knowing, supra note 51, at 133.

78.

Wilson & Gilbert, Affective, supra note 47, at 371.

79. See, e.g., Wilson & Gilbert, Knowing, supra note 51, at 133 ("A feature that all these
defenses have in common is that they are largely unconscious, and in fact are more effective by
operating behind the mental scenes."). Wilson and Gilbert describe the tendency not to anticipate the

operation of the psychological immune system as "immune neglect." Id.
80.
See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 45, at 181 ("Intense suffering triggers the very processes that
eradicate it, while mild suffering does not .... ").
81.
See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The PeculiarLongevity of Things Not So Bad, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI.

14 (2004).
82.

GILBERT, supra note 45, at 181.

83.

Gilbert et al., Looking, supra note 66, at 349.
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or well-being "set point" from which we do not deviate too far or for too
long; that is, genes explain most of the variation in subjective well-being,
with external events contributing only marginally.8 4 Second, our set points
appear to be set relatively high-in study after study, researchers have
found that most of us report high levels of subjective well-being. 85 Third,
even though regret is among the most common of emotions, researchers
routinely find that we report surprisingly few life regrets. 86 Lecci and his
84.

See, e.g., DAVID LYKKEN, HAPPINESS: WHAT STUDIES ON TWINS SHOW Us ABOUT NATURE,

NURTURE, AND THE HAPPINESS SET POINT 58 (1999) ("Nearly 100 percent of the variation across

people in the happiness set point seems to be due to individual differences in genetic makeup!"); Frank
Fujita & Ed Diener, Life Satisfaction Set Point: Stability and Change, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 158, 162 (2005) (finding less long-term stability in life satisfaction ("LS") scores than
predicted but concluding nonetheless that "there appears to be a 'soft baseline' for LS, with people
fluctuating around a stable set point that nonetheless does move for about a quarter of the population");
David Lykken & Auke Tellegen, Happiness Is a Stochastic Phenomenon, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 186, 188
(1996) (finding, based on a study of twins, that 80% of the variance in well-being is a product of genes).
But see Richard E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of Happiness:
Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 527, 535-36 (2003)
(finding that the negative impact of widowhood on well-being can be substantial but noting
conservatively that "[o]ne implication of these findings is that long-term levels of [subjective wellbeing] are not solely determined by personality and genetic predispositions") (emphasis added);
Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Pointfor Life Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8,
11-12 (2004) (finding evidence that "unemployment seems to have had a lasting effect on individuals'
life satisfaction" but that "the data simply suggest that temperament is not the sole influence on longterm levels of life satisfaction") (emphasis added).
85. Ed and Carol Diener observe that "[in every U.S. national survey, most people have reported
a positive level of [subjective well-being]." Ed Diener & Carol Diener, Most People Are Happy, 7
PSYCHOL. SCI. 181, 181 (1996). Likewise, global reports of well-being are high; in one survey, for
instance, 86% of the nations reported a positive (rather than neutral or negative) overall well-being. Id.
In short, "most individuals are above neutral" in their sense of well-being, suggesting that "most people
are resilient in that they can recover from adversity." Id. at 185.
86. See, e.g., Anne A. Lawrence, Factors Associated with Satisfaction or Regret Following
Male-to-FemaleSex Reassignment Surgery, 32 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 299, 305 (2003) (finding,
among a study of people who underwent sex reassignment surgery, that "[n]o participants reported
consistent Regret, and only 15 participants (6%) were sometimes regretful"); Lecci et al., supra note 22,
at 736 (finding, in their study of the phenomenology of regret, that "[s]ubjects listed an average of 3.2
goals and 1.9 regrets, although II individuals [out of 155] were unable to identify even a single regret,
and the modal regret frequency was only one"); Mala Ramanathan & U.S. Mishra, Correlates of
Female Sterilization Regret in the Southern States of India, 32 J. BIosoc. Sci. 547, 550 (2000) (finding,
in an enormous study of women in four Indian states, that only 4.7%, 4.3%, 8.4%, and 9.6% regretted
sterilization); Sheehan et al., supra note 4, at 345 (finding a "regret" score of only 13.76 on a 100-point
scale and that more than 80% of the respondents reported no or mild regret among women completing
reconstructive breast surgery following a mastectomy); Stryker et al., supra note 4, at 107 (finding,
among a group of people who made the difficult choice to participate in clinical cancer trials, that "[t]he
average level of decisional regret was very low"); Erika Timmer, Gerben J. Westerhof & Freya
Dittman-Kohli, "When Looking Back on My Past Life I Regret... ": Retrospective Regret in the Second
Half of Life, 29 DEATH STUD. 625, 634 (2005) (finding that, even when prompted to reflect on one's
past and provide a regret, 14% of subjects identified no regrets at all); Cynthia M. Torges, Abigail J.
Stewart & Kathi Minor-Rubino, PersonalityAfter the Prime of Life: Men and Women Coming to Terms
with Regret, 39 J. RES. PERSONALITY 148, 157 (2005) (finding that only 52% of the participants in their
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colleagues found, for example, that subjects in their study "reported
relatively few regrets (a modal frequency of just one)" and that this is
"consistent with research showing that the vast majority of individuals
report relatively high levels of well-being despite experiencing negative life
events." 87 This research strongly suggests that the vast majority of women
who have terminated their pregnancies will experience comparably high
levels of well-being and comparably low levels of regret. 8
C. REGRET DAMPENING

In addition to the dampening that occurs naturally through the
unconscious operation of our psychological immune system, 89 we can, and
do, consciously deploy other tactics to minimize feelings of regret. 90 This
Article identifies three of the most common regret-dampening tactics:
reassessing our decision options, redirecting our attention, and relating our
experiences.
1. Reassessing Decision Options
When we make a decision and feel regret, we experience "cognitive
dissonance."' We can reduce this unpleasant feeling by reassessing the
study reported a regret). But see Geoffrey T. Fong et al., The Near-Universal Experience of Regret
Among Smokers in Four Countries: Findingsfrom the InternationalTobacco ControlPolicy Evaluation
Survey, 6 NICOTINE AND TOBACCO RES. 341, 344-45 (2004) (finding that approximately 90% of
smokers regretted smoking); Sara B. Oswalt, Kenzie A. Cameron & Jeffrey J. Koob, Sexual Regret in
College Students, 34 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 663, 666 (2005) (finding that roughly three-quarters of
college students in their sample reported at least one regret about prior sexual behavior).
87. Lecci et al., supra note 22, at 738.
88. For one illustrative study that is on point, see A. Kero, U. Hbgberg & A. Lalos, Wellbeing
andMental Growth-Long-Term Effects ofLegal Abortion, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2559, 2568-69 (2004)
("In summary, the pregnancy was found to cause painful feelings in almost all the women, while the
abortion at both 4-month and 12-month follow-up was experienced by almost all as a relief and was
regarded as the best possible solution. Almost two-thirds reported only positive experiences as sequels
of the abortion process, such as a feeling of wellbeing and mental growth at the I-year follow-up. In
conclusion, this study shows that these Swedish women in general are able to make the complex
decision to have an abortion without suffering any regret or negative effects 1 year later.").
89. See supra Part lI.B. Note also that researchers have found that there is "a consistent temporal
pattern to the experience of regret." Gilovich & Medvec, supra note 24, at 361. Namely, "[a]ctions
produce greater regret in the short term; inactions generate more regret in the long run." Id. Applied to
abortion, the initial decision to abort-an action-might generate more regret in the short term;
however, in the long run a woman is more likely to feel regret about things she left undone than the
things she did.
90. For an attempt to identify tactics to dampen both anticipated and experienced regret, see
Zeelenberg & Pieters, supra note 23, at 11-14. See also J. Jeffrey Inman, Regret Regulation:
DisentanglingSelf-Reproach from Learning, 17 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 19, 22-23 (2007) (critiquing
the Zeelenberg & Pieters framework and advancing additional regret regulation tactics).
91.
See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (introducing
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decision options we previously faced; in the language of dissonance theory,
we can "increas[e] the attractiveness of the chosen
alternative and
92
decreas[e] the attractiveness of the rejected alternative."
This reassessment process often happens naturally and
unconsciously. 93 In the classic illustration, the psychologist Jack Brehm
asked college students to evaluate the desirability of several products,
select one of two products identified by the experimenter, and finally,
reevaluate the desirability of all of the products. 94 As predicted, Brehm
found that the subjects evaluated the chosen item more favorably and the
rejected item less favorably after making the decision than they had
before. 95 This was particularly true following a "difficult" decision in
which the subjects were asked to choose between two items they had rated
comparably in advance. 96 Researchers have replicated and extended these
97
results on dissonance reduction in many contexts.
dissonance theory). See also id. at 36 ("[D]issonance is an almost inevitable consequence of a
decision ....
").
92. Leon Festinger, Introduction, in CONFLICT, DECISION, AND DISSONANCE 1, 5-6 (Robert R.
Sears et al. eds., 1964). Other ways to reduce postdecision dissonance include denying responsibility or
trivializing the decision. See, e.g., Patrick Gosling, Maxime Denizeau & Dominique Oberl&, Denial of
Responsibility: A New Mode of DissonanceReduction, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 722, 72426 (2006); Linda Simon, Jeff Greenberg & Jack Brehm, Trivilialization: The Forgotten Mode of
Dissonance Reduction, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247 (1995). See also Nick Sevdalis &
Flora Kokkinaki, The Differential Effect of Realistic and Unrealistic Counterfactual Thinking on
Regret, 122 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 111(2006) (arguing, based on their empirical work, that we can
reduce feelings of postdecision regret by focusing on situational rather than personal factors that give
rise to a regretted behavior, thereby mitigating our feelings of responsibility and blame); Carsten
Wrosch & Jutta Heckhausen, Perceived Control of Life Regrets: Good for Young and Bad for Old
Adults, 17 PSYCHOL. & AGING 340, 340, 347 (2002) (finding that "attributions of low internal control
might serve self-protective functions in older adults and facilitate deactivation of regret" because such
attributions "may reduce the perceived responsibility and, thus, may also reduce the negative emotional
consequences of failure experience").
93. One potential trigger is "option attachment." See Ziv Carmon, Klaus Wertenbroch & Marcel
Zeelenberg, Option Attachment: When Deliberating Makes Choosing Feel Like Losing, 30 J.
CONSUMER RES. 15 (2003). Carmon and his colleagues have found that when we make a decision
carefully and deliberatively, we become attached to the foregone option, which leads us in the
immediate aftermath of the decision to feel regretful about rejecting that option, which in turn leads us
to attempt to reduce dissonance. Id. at 27.
94. Jack W. Brehm, Postdecision Changes in the Desirability of Alternatives, 52 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 384-85 (1956).
95. Id. at 386.
96. Id. at 389.
97. See, e.g., Ryan K. Beasley & Mark. R. Joslyn, Cognitive Dissonance and Post-Decision
Attitude Change in Six PresidentialElections, 22 POL. PSYCHOL. 521 (2001) (finding evidence of
reassessment of candidates following election results); Gilovich etal., supra note 32, at 186 (finding
that dissonance reduction is greater when people switch choices rather than stay); Nira Liberman & Jens
F6rster, Inferencesfrom Decision Difficulty, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 290, 296-99 (2006)
(finding evidence of "spreading" in finished decisions but not repeatable decisions, which is expected
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This reassessment process can also be a product of conscious design.
For example, we can reduce dissonance intentionally by trying to adopt an
"action-oriented mindset. ' '98 In one study illustrating this process, Eddie
Harmon-Jones and Cindy Harmon-Jones asked subjects to rate the
desirability of various forms of exercise, such as jumping rope and lifting
weights. 99 Then the researchers asked the subjects to choose one of two
exercises to perform. 10 0 Unbeknownst to the subjects, the researchers
assigned some of them to a control group and others to an experimental
group.' 01 The researchers attempted to induce the subjects in this latter
group to adopt an action-oriented mindset by instructing them to describe
in writing at least seven things they could do to improve their performance
on the chosen exercise.10 2 Finally, the researchers asked the subjects in
both groups to reevaluate the exercises. 0 3 Consistent with Brehm's
research, the researchers found that all of the subjects increased their
evaluation of the chosen option and decreased their evaluation of the
rejected option, but this reassessment was even more pronounced among
those in the action-oriented mindset group. 10 4 In other words, those subjects
who focused on how they would implement their decision were likely to
inflate their evaluation of the chosen option and deflate their evaluation of
the rejected option even more than those subjects in the control group. This
means, of course, that when we make a decision and feel regret, we may be
able to dampen that regret by focusing on how we will make the most of
the decision we have made.
given that dissonance reduction is unnecessary if the decision can be undone); Thomas R. Shultz, El&ne
Lveill & Mark R. Lepper, Free Choice and Cognitive Dissonance Revisited: Choosing "Lesser
Evils" Versus Greater "Goods," 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 40 (1999) (replicating
Brehm's results and finding in difficult decisions involving unattractive options that decision makers
are particularly likely to inflate their postdecision evaluations of the chosen option). But see liana Ritov,
The Effect of Time on Pleasure with Chosen Outcomes, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 177 (2006)

(finding decreased satisfaction with chosen outcomes in the long term, prompting her to question
whether postdecision spreading of decision options is long lived). Note that researchers have found not
only that we change our attitudes following a decision to support the selected outcome, but also that our
memory changes to support our selected outcome. See, e.g., Mara Mather, Eldar Shafir & Marcia K.
Johnson, Misremembrance of Options Past: Source Monitoringand Choice, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 132, 137
(2000).
98.
Eddie Harmon-Jones & Cindy Harmon-Jones, Testing the Action-Based Model of Cognitive
Dissonance: The Effect of Action Orientation on PostdecisionalAttitudes, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC.

PSYCHOL. BULL. 711, 714 (2002).
99. Id. at 714-15.
100. Id. at 715.
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 715-17.
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2. Redirecting Attention
A second way we can dampen feelings of postdecision regret is by
consciously redirecting our attention away from the negative feelings
associated with the decision we have made. For example, we can search out
"silver linings" associated with a regretted decision or behavior. 10 5 In one
instructive study, researchers evaluated the coping behavior of prison
inmates housed in two correctional facilities. 1°6 The researchers
interviewed the inmates to determine whether they had used the silverlining tactic to dampen their regrets. 10 7 They found that two-thirds of the
inmates had used this coping tactic and that these inmates reported a
over time and significantly lower levels of
significant decrease in regret
08
inmates.'
other
than
regret
We can also redirect our attention toward currently active life goals.
As Len Lecci, Morris Okun, and Paul Karoly explain:
Researchers have shown that the incidence and intensity of regretful
ruminations can be temporarily minimized when the individual is
focused on the pursuit of active responses (i.e., using an active goal as a
"distraction").... which in turn may lead to a more permanent
of regretful ruminations and greater psychological wellsuppression
09
being. 1

Consistent with this observation, Carsten Wrosch and his colleagues
found that older adults who focused on future goals experienced lower
105. Gilovich & Medvec, supra note 24, at 387 (explaining that "people acknowledge that the
outcome may have been regrettable, but they mentally offset the regret by identifying a silver lining that
consists of how much they profited from the experience as well"). See also Sunghwan Yi & Hans
Baumgartner, Coping with Negative Emotions in Purchase-Related Situations, 14 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 303, 305 (2004) (describing this regret-dampening tactic as "positive reinterpretation"). Note
that "reassessing" and "redirecting" can work hand-in-hand as regret-dampening tactics. See, e.g.,
Gilovich & Medvec, supra note 24, at 387 ("Identifying a silver lining in a dark cloud can be one way
to reduce the cognitive dissonance associated with a negative outcome brought on by a freely chosen
action."); Priyali Rajagopal, Sekar Raju & H. Rao Unnava, Differences in the Cognitive Accessibility of
Action and Inaction Regrets, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 302, 310 (2006) (identifying the
silver lining tactic as a way of reducing dissonance associated with regretted actions).
106. Frenk van Harreveld et al., Inmate Emotion Coping and Psychological and Physical WellBeing: The Use of Crying Over Spilled Milk, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 697, 700 (2007).
107. Id. at 704.
108. Id. (reporting that ten participants saw no positive aspects, while the remaining twenty said
that they had gained something from the experience). See also Torges et al., supra note 86, at 162
("People who put the best face on regrets or who come to terms with regret were significantly higher in
life satisfaction and recent positive mood .... "); Yi & Baumgartner, supra note 105, at 314 (reporting
that subjects used the silver-lining tactic or "positive reinterpretation" to cope with feelings of regret
following a purchasing decision).
109. Lecci et al., supra note 22, at 738 (internal citations omitted).
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levels of regret intensity than those who did not. 110 In short, we can
dampen regret both by focusing on the positives rather than the negatives
and by looking forward rather than backward.
3. Relating Experiences
In addition to reassessing decision options and redirecting our
attention, we can also dampen regret by relating or recording our
experiences and reactions. In one recent study, researchers asked
participants to reflect on the most traumatic event they had experienced.1 1'
For each of three days, some of the participants thought privately about the
experience, others talked into a tape recorder about the experience, and still
others wrote about the experience. 1 2 The researchers found, both
immediately after the experiment and four weeks later, that the study
participants who had spoken or written about this experience reported a
greater sense of well-being than those who had merely thought about it.113
Although this study did not focus specifically on regret, it did focus on
traumatic life experiences, and presumably for some participants, their
most traumatic experience was one that induced feelings of regret.
settings-including
from
other
evidence
ample
Moreover,
psychotherapyl 14 -- provides support for the proposition that we can
minimize negative affect by talking or writing about it. 115 In the inmate
study described above, for example, researchers found that those who
engaged in an "active" coping strategy, such as "talking to fellow inmates
or family about their worries," felt significantly less regret than those
to be
inmates who engaged in "passive" coping strategies, like "wanting
' 116
television."
watching
and
thoughts,
any
out
shut
to
trying
alone,
left
Following an abortion, a woman who experiences regret can use each
110.

Carsten Wrosch, Isabelle Bauer & Michael F. Scheier, Regret and Quality of Life Across the

Adult Life Span: The Influence of Disengagement and Available Future Goals, 20 PSYCHOL. & AGING

657, 667 (2005).
111. Sonja Lyubomirsky, Lorie Sousa & Rene Dickerhoof, The Costs and Benefits of Writing,
Talking, and Thinking About Life's Triumphs and Defeats, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOc. PSYCHOL. 692,

696 (2006).
112. Id. at 696-97.
113. Id. at 699.
114. See Daniel A. Donnelly & Edward J. Murray, Cognitive and Emotional Changes in Written
Essays and Therapy Interviews, 10 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 334, 348 (1991) (reporting that
writing about a traumatic event facilitates coping).
115. See also GILBERT, supra note 45, at 186-87 (observing that "simply writing about a
trauma-such as the death of a loved one or a physical assault-can lead to surprising improvements in
both subjective well-being and physical health").
116. van Harreveld et al., supra note 106, at 703.
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of these dampening tactics. She can reassess her original decision options,
identifying reasons why abortion was the right decision and why carrying
to term was the wrong decision. For example, she might focus on the fact
that she avoided the discomfort and pain associated with pregnancy and
childbirth1 17 and that she did not become a mother at a time in her life
when she was unprepared emotionally or financially to do so. 118 She can
consciously redirect her attention to positive aspects of her decision or to
future life goals, like focusing on her education or career. And she can
write about her experience in a journal or talk about it with friends, family,
or other loved ones. In short, a woman who has terminated her pregnancy
can use these regret-dampening tactics to make peace with her decision if,
in fact, she feels any regret at all. 119
D. REGRET LEARNING

Despite evidence suggesting that a woman is unlikely to experience
intense and long-lasting regret following abortion, 120 and despite evidence
suggesting that there are many tactics she can deploy to dampen any regret
she does feel, 12 1 some women will no doubt experience lingering and
intense feelings of regret upon terminating a pregnancy. These persistent
feelings might be harmful, 122 but they might also present an opportunity to
learn and grow. Indeed, some psychotherapists consciously use regret as a
123
tool to enable their clients to make productive changes in their lives.
117. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) ("The mother
who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must
bear.").
118.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("Mental and physical health may be taxed
by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there
is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care
for it.").
119.
See Yi & Baumgartner, supra note 105, at 305, 312-14 (describing "acceptance" as a coping
strategy and providing evidence that those who feel regret following a purchase decision experience
regret). In contrast to acceptance, we can also minimize our regrets by disengaging from a prior
decision or experience that has caused us to feel regret. See, e.g., Wrosch et al., supra note 110, at 66668 (describing the adaptive benefits of disengaging).
120.
See supra Part 11.B.
121.
See supra Part II.C.
122.
See, e.g., Markku Jokisaari, Regret Appraisals, Age, and Subjective Well-Being, 37 J. RES.
PERSONALITY 487, 497 (2003) (finding that those with greater regrets were more likely to report lower
life satisfaction); Lecci et al., supra note 22, at 736 (finding regret associated with lower life satisfaction
and depression).
123.
See, e.g., Greenberg & FitzPatrick, supra note 25, at 35-36; Harold H. Mosak, Guilt, Guilt
Feelings, Regret, and Repentance, 43 INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOL. 288, 292 (1987) (arguing that therapists
should seek to "substitute regret for guilty feeling[s]"); Jeanne Shaw, The Usefulness of Remorse, in
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND THE REMORSEFUL PATIENT 77, 78-79 (E. Mark Stem ed. 1989) (contending that
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Researchers have found that experienced regret, like anticipated
regret, motivates us to take steps to avoid or at least minimize future
regrets. 124 In one study, for example, Ira Roseman, Cynthia Wiest, and
Tamara Swartz asked participants to recall, describe, and respond to a
series of questions about events giving rise to certain, specified emotions
(namely, fear, sadness, distress, frustration, disgust, dislike, anger, regret,
guilt, and shame). 125 The researchers then analyzed and compared the
participants' responses to identify the defining characteristics associated
with these different emotions. With regard to regret, they found that
participants reported a strong motivation to distance themselves from their
prior regrets and to behave differently in the future:
In regret experiences, as predicted, subjects felt a sinking feeling,
thought about a lost opportunity and a mistake that they had made, felt
like "kicking" themselves and correcting their mistake, actually did
something differently, and wanted to get a second chance and improve
their performance. Overall, regret seems to be an emotion in which
people seek to distance themselves from what they had done previously,
for example, 12 6by changing their behavior to improve on past
performances.
Not only does the experience of regret motivate us to minimize future
regret, it can also lead to actual behavioral change. In one study, for
regret or remorse can be a productive emotion in therapy). But see Stanley Rosner, On the Place of
Regrets in Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, II PSYCHOANALYSIS & PSYCHOTHERAPY 86, 87 (1994)
(arguing that the fear of confronting one's regrets might impede treatment); Peter Shabad, Fitationand
the Road Not Taken, 4 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOL. 187, 197-200 (1987) (arguing that regret might
create resistance to change).
124. Janet Landman et al., Missed Opportunities:Psychological Ramifications of Counterfactual
Thought in Midlife Women, 2 J. ADULT DEV. 87, 89 (1995) ("Like pain, counterfactual thought about a
regrettable past may serve instructional and motivational purposes-telling us that something is wrong
and moving us to do something about it.").
125.
Roseman et al., supra note 26, at 208-09.
126. Id. at 213-14. In a follow-up study, Marcel Zeelenberg and his colleagues used a procedure
that was similar to the procedure used by Roseman and his colleagues to compare subjects' reports
about the experience of regret versus the experience of disappointment-an emotion that Roseman and
his colleagues did not include in their study. Marcel Zeelenberg et al., The Experience of Regret and
Disappointment, 12 COGNITION & EMOTION 221, 223-24, 227 (1998). They summarized their results as
follows:
On the basis of our findings, the experience of regret can be differentiated from that of
disappointment in that the former involves feeling more intensely that one should have known
better, thinking about what a mistake one has made, feeling a tendency to kick oneself and to
correct one's mistake, and wanting to undo the event and to get a second chance.
Id. at 227. In short, regret "motivates one to think about how this event could have happened and how
one could change it, or how one could prevent its future occurrence." Id. at 228. See also Arthur W.
Blume & Karen B. Schmaling, Regret, Substance Abuse, and Readiness to Change in a Dually
Diagnosed Sample, 23 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 693, 696 (1998) (finding that experienced regret creates
motivation to alter substance use).
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example, researchers explored whether induced feelings of regret would
increase the likelihood that subjects would make responsible dietary
decisions.' 27 In this study, researchers asked subjects to identify and
describe a prior event that gave rise to one of three specified emotions:
fear, regret, or responsibility. 128 Then, the researchers gave all of the
subjects a pamphlet entitled, "Not Eating Fiber can KILL," which
identified key reasons why young adults should eat a high-fiber diet. 129 A
week later, the researchers brought a high-fiber cereal and a low-fiber
cereal to class and recorded which of the cereals the subjects chose to eat.
Among those who felt regretful, 71% chose the high-fiber cereal as
compared to only 29% of the responsibility subjects, 3% of the fear
subjects, and 27% of the subjects in the control group.' 30 Feelings of regret
produced more behavioral change than the other felt emotions.
In another study, these same researchers gave subjects a pamphlet
describing "Andy," an individual battling malignant melanoma. 131 Some of
the pamphlets attempted to induce feelings of regret-by, for example,
indicating that "Andy admitted self-blame because of his poor decision
making"-while others attempted to induce other emotions. In the "hope"
condition, for example, Andy expressed the desire to get well.13 2 All of the
pamphlets concluded by recommending the use of sunscreen.1 33 The
following day, three days later, ten days later, and eighteen days later, the
researchers asked all of the subjects whether they had used sunscreen on
those days. Those who experienced regret were more likely than any of the
other subjects to have used sunscreen. 134 Three days after the experiment,
for example, 78% of the regret subjects-as compared to 25% of the fear
subjects, 29% of the hope subjects, and 44% of the challenge subjects135
reported applying sunscreen.
Finally, in three studies, researchers found that subjects who
experienced regret over a decision were significantly more likely than those
who simply felt disappointed about the decision to alter their behavior. In
one of these experiments, researchers found that subjects who felt regret
127.

Kirsten Passyn & Mita Sujan, Self-Accountability Emotions and Fear Appeals: Motivating

Behavior, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 583, 587-88 (2006).
128.

Id. at 587.

129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 588 tbl.3.
Id. at 585-87.

132.

Id. at 585.

133.
134.

Id.
Id. at 587 tbl.2.

135.

Id.
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changed their future behavior in a lottery; 13 6 in the other two experiments,
researchers found that subjects were more likely to switch from one service
provider-such as a cell phone company or internet provider-to another if
they regretted retaining the initial service provider.13 7 Summarizing this
work, the researchers explained that these "studies show that regret
strongly promotes the tendency to switch to another option or behavioral
alternative and that this effect is driven by regret." 138 In short, "experienced
1 39
retrospective regret promotes decisions that make this regret disappear."'
Unfortunately, we do not know as much about the impact of
experienced regret on future behavior as we do about other aspects of
regret. 140 What we do know, however, suggests that regret can be
powerfully motivating, enabling us to identify mistakes, learn from them,
and behave differently in the future. As Barry Schwartz puts it, regret
"serves several important functions."' 14 1 Among others, it "may mobilize or
motivate us to take the actions necessary to undo a decision or ameliorate
some of its unfortunate consequences," and it "may emphasize the mistakes
we made in arriving at a decision, so that, should
a similar situation arise in
142
the future, we won't make the same mistakes."'
136. Marcel Zeelenberg, J. Jeffrey Inman & Rik G.M. Pieters, What We Do When Decisions Go
Awry: Behavioral Consequences of Experienced Regret, in CONFLICT AND TRADEOFFS IN DECISION
MAKING 136, 147-48 (Elke U. Weber et al. eds., 2001) (citing to an unpublished study).
137. See Marcel Zeelenberg & Rik Pieters, Beyond Valence in Customer Dissatisfaction:A
Review and New Findings on Behavioral Responses to Regret and Disappointment in FailedServices,
57 J. Bus. RES. 445, 451-52 (2004); Marcel Zeelenberg & Rik Pieters, ComparingService Delivery to
What Might Have Been: Behavioral Responses to Regret and Disappointment, 2 J. SERVICE RES. 86,
91-95 (1999).
138. Zeelenberg et al., supra note 136, at 148-49.
139. Zeelenberg & Beattie, supra note 36, at 76. But see Rebecca K. Ratner & Kenneth C. Herbst,
When Good Decisions Have Bad Outcomes: The Impact of Affect on Switching Behavior, 96
ORGANIZATIONAL

BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 23, 35 (2005)

("These four studies

demonstrate that individuals feel regret when they choose a probabilistically favored option and the
outcome is unfavorable. As a result, they are less willing to choose that decision option again in the
future, even when they believe that the option is more likely than the alternatives to produce a
successful outcome."); Abigail J. Stewart & Elizabeth A. Vandewater, "If I Had It to Do Over
Again...": Midlife Review, Midcourse Corrections, and Women's Well-Being in Midlife, 76 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 270 (1999) (finding among middle-aged women considering
educational or career regrets that regret motivated goal setting but did not necessarily lead to behavioral
change).
140. See, e.g., Zeelenberg & Beattie, supra note 36, at 72 (observing that "[ulntil now regret
research has predominantly focused on the effects of the anticipation of this emotional state on decision
making," yet this is "only half of the story"); Zeelenberg et al., supra note 136, at 152 (observing that
"there is a paucity of research" addressing "regret effects on behavior in our daily lives"); Zeelenberg &
Pieters, supra note 23, at 11 ("[T]here is, as yet, little systematic research on regret regulation
strategies ...").
141. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 164.
142. Id. See also Bailey & Kinerson, supra note 34, at 26 ("We found that people are less likely to
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To be sure, abortion differs in important ways from dieting, using
sunscreen, playing the lottery, or deciding whether to switch a service
provider. The fact that those who experienced regret in these instances
subsequently altered their behavior suggests, however, that those women
who find themselves feeling postabortion regret are also likely to take steps
to avoid future related regrets. Among other things, for example, they
might select different sexual partners, alter the sexual behavior they engage
in with their partners, use birth control, and so on. This means that when
the Court constrains the exercise of the abortion right--or any other right,
for that matter-it limits not only the right to make a choice but also the
opportunity to learn from the very act of choosing.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's observation in Carhartthat some women will
experience regret following abortion is unremarkable. Likewise, it would
be unremarkable to observe that the decision to act on any number of rights
protected by the Constitution might also lead to feelings of regret. What is
remarkable, though, is using the prospect of regret to justify limiting a
woman's right to choose or any other right ostensibly protected by the
Constitution.
This Article has identified four separate, but overlapping, reasons why
the Court's regret analysis in Carhartis misguided: regret aversion, regret
overestimation, regret dampening, and regret learning. Simply stated, a
woman contemplating abortion is likely to anticipate and seek to avoid
regret; overestimate its impact on her well-being; take conscious steps to
dampen any regret that she feels; and use that regret to make better
decisions for herself in the future. This is not to deny that some women,
including the women identified in the Justice Foundation's amicus brief in
Carhart,experience significant regret following abortion.143 Nor is this to
invest in a manner in which they had experienced regret, i.e., the experience of regret with a particular
type of investment."); Zeelenberg & Pieters, supranote 23, at 13 (contending that "regret not only helps
us to remember our mistakes and missed opportunities and motivates us to engage in reparative action;
by means of mental undoing it also prepares us to behave more appropriately when we are confronted
with similar choices in the future").
143. As Jeremy Blumenthal explains:
Women generally experience positive emotions after abortion; indeed, positive emotions are
clearly more prevalent than negative emotions. Nevertheless, some women are more at risk
than others to negative psychological sequelae: those who pursue abortion for reasons of birth
defects in the fetus; younger women; unmarried women without children; women who lack
social support; and women who had previously suffered some sort of emotional disturbance
or psychological dysfunction.
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion,and Emotion: Implications of Social Science Research on
Emotionfor Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV.1,10-11 (2008).

2008]

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REGRET

assume that all of us experience regret similarly; in fact, there is evidence
suggesting that there are some individual differences in the experience of
certain kinds of regrets. 144 However, the bulk of the empirical evidence on
the operation of regret-just like the bulk of the empirical evidence on
postabortion well-being cited by Justice Ginsberg in dissent-strongly
suggests that most women fare quite well following abortion. For these
reasons, the Court was wrong to invoke the prospect of postabortion regret
in Carhart,and it should not use regret to impose further limits on abortion
45
or any other constitutional right. 1
144.
See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, at 86-87, 146 ("maximizers" are more likely than
"satisficers" to experience regret); Aidan Feeney et al., Is Regret for Inaction Relatively SelfEnhancing?, 19 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 761 (2005) (finding differences in the experience of
regret between high and low self-esteem subjects); Fong et al., supra note 86, at 346 (finding gender
and age differences regarding smoking regret); Lucia Mannetti, Antonio Pierro & Arie Kruglanski, Who
Regrets More After Choosing a Non-Status-Quo Option? Post Decisional Regret Under Need for
Cognitive Closure,28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 186 (2007) (finding that those with a high "need for cognitive
closure" experience more regret than those without); Michelle Renee Monroe et al., The Mildly
Depressed Experience More Post-DecisionalRegret than the Non-Depressed, 24 J. Soc. & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 665 (2005) (finding that the mildly depressed experience greater regret over decisions than
the non-depressed); Wrosch & Heckhausen, supra note 92 (finding age-related differences in the
experience of regret); Wrosch et al., supra note 110 (finding age-related differences in the experience of
regret).
For more on the importance of taking individual difference into account when undertaking law
and social science research, see generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect
Rationality Should Not Be Tradedfor Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO.
L.J. 67 (2002).
145.
The argument this Article advances is obviously relevant to the "paternalism debate" raging
among behavioral law and economics scholars. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, LibertarianPaternalism Is
an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological
Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler,
LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). As indicated, the author
believes that the paternalism embodied in the Carhart decision is misguided, but is not opposed to
paternalistic interventions in general-particularly "light" ones. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Emily
Haisley, The Economist as Therapist: Methodological Ramifications of "Light" Paternalism, I
Handbook Econ. Methodologies (forthcoming 2008) (proposing light paternalism).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:877

